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Abstract. Spam is serious problem that affects email users (e.g. phish-
ing attacks, viruses and time spent reading unwanted messages). We
propose a novel spam email filtering approach based on network-level
attributes (e.g. the IP sender geographic coordinates) that are more
persistent in time when compared to message content. This approach
was tested using two classifiers, Naive Bayes (NB) and Support Vec-
tor Machines (SVM), and compared against bag-of-words models and
eight blacklists. Several experiments were held with recent collected le-
gitimate (ham) and non legitimate (spam) messages, in order to simulate
distinct user profiles from two countries (USA and Portugal). Overall,
the network-level based SVM model achieved the best discriminatory
performance. Moreover, preliminary results suggests that such method
is more robust to phishing attacks.
Keywords: Anti-Spam filtering, Text Mining, Naive Bayes, Support
Vector Machines
1 Introduction
Email is a commonly used service for communication and information sharing.
However, unsolicited e-mail (spam) emerged very quickly after email itself and
currently accounts for 89% to 92% of all email messages sent [11]. The cost
of sending these emails is very close to zero, since criminal organizations have
access to millions of infected computers (known as botnets) [15]. Spam consumes
resources, such as time spent reading unwanted messages, bandwidth, CPU and
disk [6]. Also, spam is an intrusion of privacy and used to spread malicious
content (e.g. phishing attacks, online fraud or viruses).
The majority of the current anti-spam solutions are based on [3]: Content-
Based Filtering (CBF) and Collaborative Filtering (CF). CBF is the most popu-
lar anti-spam approach, using message features (e.g. word frequencies) and Data
Mining (DM) algorithms (e.g. Naive Bayes) to discriminate between legitimate
(ham) and spam messages. CF works by sharing information about spam mes-
sages. One common CF variant is the DNS-based Blackhole List (DNSBL), also
known as blacklist, which contains known IP addresses used by spammers. CF
and CBF can also be combined. For example, a blacklist is often used at a server
level to tag a large number of spam. The remaining spam can be detected later
by using a personalized CBF at the client level (e.g. Thunderbird SpamBayes,
http://www.entrian.com/sbwiki).
Spam content is very easy to forge in order to confuse CBF filters. For ex-
ample, normal words can be mixed into spam messages and this heavily reduces
the CBF performance [13]. In contrast, spammers have far less flexibility in
changing network-level features. Yet, the majority of the spam research gives
attention to content and the number of studies that address network-level prop-
erties is scarce. In 2005, Leiba et al. [9] proposed a reputation learning algorithm
that is based on the network path (from sender to receiver) of the message. Such
algorithm obtained a high accuracy when combined with a CBF bayesian filter.
Ramachandran and Feamster [15] have shown that there are spam/ham differ-
ences for several network-level characteristics (e.g. IP address space), although
the authors did not test these characteristics to filter spam using DM algorithms.
More recently, transport-level properties (e.g. TCP packet stream) were used to
classify spam messages, attaining a classification accuracy higher than 90% [1].
In this paper, we explore network-level characteristics to discriminate spam
(see Section 2.1). We use some of the features suggested in [15] (e.g. operating
system of sender) and we also propose new properties, such as the IP geographic
coordinates of the sender, which have the advantage of aggregating several IPs.
Moreover, in contrast with previous studies (e.g. [9, 1]), we collected emails from
two countries (U.S. and Portugal) and tested two classifiers: Naive Bayes and
Support Vector Machines (Section 2.2). Furthermore, our approach is compared
with eight DNSBLs and CBF models (i.e. bag-of-words) and we show that our
strategy is more robust to phishing attacks (Section 3).
2 Materials and Methods
2.1 Spam Telescope Data
To collect the data, we designed and developed the spam telescope repository.
The aim of this repository is to perform a longitudinal and controlled study
by gathering a significant slice of the world spam traffic. Spam was harvested
by setting several spam traps; i.e. fake emails that were advertised through the
Internet (e.g. Web pages). To collect ham, we created email addresses what were
inscribed in moderated mailing lists with distinct topics. Figure 1 shows the
proportions of mailing list topics that were used in our datasets. For both spam
and ham collection, we tried to mimic real users from two countries: U.S. and
Portugal (PT). For instance, we first registered a U.S. domain (.com) and then
set the corresponding Domain Name System (DNS) Mail Exchange (MX) record.
Next, the USA spam traps were advertised in USA popular Web sites and the
USA ham emails were inscribed in 12 USA mailing lists. A similar procedure
was taken to harvest the Portuguese messages (e.g. .pt domain).
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Fig. 1. Pie charts showing the distribution of mailing list topics for each dataset
All spam telescope messages were gathered at a specially crafted server. This
server uses virtual hosting to redirect addresses from distinct Internet domains
and runs a customized Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) program called
Mail Avenger (http://www.mailavenger.org). We set Mail Avenger to tag each
received message with the following information:
– IP address of the sender and a traceroute to this IP;
– Operating System (OS) of the sender, as estimated from a passive p0f TCP
fingerprint;
– lookup at eight DNSBLs: cbl.abuseat.org (B1), dnsbl.sorbs.net (B2), bl.-
spamcop.net (B3), sbl-xbl.spamhaus.org (B4), dul.dnsbl.sorbs.net (B5), zen.-
spamhaus.org (B6), psbl.surriel.com (B7) and blackholes.five-ten-sg.com (B8).
The four network-level properties used in this study are presented in Table
1. Instead of using direct IP addresses, we opt for geographic coordinates (i.e.
latitude and longitude), as collected by querying the free http://ipinfodb.com
database. The geographic features have the advantage of aggregating several
IPs. Also, it it known that a large fraction of spam comes from specific regions
(e.g. Asia) [15]. The NHOP is a distance measure that was computed using the
traceroute command. The passive OS signatures were encoded into four classes:
windows – if from the MS family (e.g. windows 2000); linux (if a linux kernel is
used); other (e.g. Mac, freebsd, openbsd, solaris); and unknown (if not detected).
Table 1. Network-level attributes
Attribute Domain
NHOP – number of hops/routers to sender {8,9,. . .,65}
Lat. – latitude of the IP of sender [-42.92◦,68.97◦]
Long. – longitude of the IP of sender [-168.10◦,178.40◦]
OS – operating system of sender {windows,linux,other,unknown}
In this study, we collected recent data, from April 21st April to November
9th 2009. Five datasets were created in order to mimic distinct and realistic user
profiles (Table 2). The US1 set uses ham from 6 mailing lists whose members
are mostly U.S. based, while US2 contains ham from different U.S. lists and
that is more spread through the five continents (Figure 2). Regarding the spam,
the data collected from the U.S. traps was added into US1 and US2, while PT
includes only features extracted from Portuguese traps. The mixture of ham
and spam was based on the time that each message was received (date field),
which we believe is more realistic than the sampling procedure adopted in [12].
Given the large number of experiments addressed in this work, for US1, US2
and PT we opted to fix the global spam/ham ratio at 1. Yet, it should be
noted that the spam/ham ratios fluctuate through time (right of Figure 4). The
fourth set (US1PT) merges the data from US1 and PT, with the intention of
representing a bilingual user (e.g. Portuguese but working in U.S.). Finally, the
U.S. Without Blacklist Spam (USWBS) contains ham and spam from US2. The
aim is to mimic a hybrid blacklist-filter scenario, thus all spam that was detected
by any of the eight DNSBLs was removed from US2. For this last set, we set
the spam/ham ratio to a realistic 0.2 value, since in such scenario most spam
should be previously detected by the DNSBLs. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show several
examples of ham/spam differences when analyzing the network-level attributes.
Table 2. Summary of the Spam Telescope corpora
setup ham main #mailing #ham total spam time
language lists senders size /ham period
US1 English 6 343 3184 1.0 [23/Apr./09,9/Nov./09]
US2 English 6 506 3364 1.0 [21/Apr./09,9/Nov./09]
PT Portuguese 7 230 1046 1.0 [21/May/09,9/Nov./09]
US1PT Eng./Port. 13 573 4230 1.0 [23/Apr./09,9/Nov./09]
USWBS English 6 257 612 0.2 [21/Apr./09,9/Nov./09]
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Fig. 2. Distribution of geographic IP of sender (black squares denote ham, gray circles
show spam) for the used datasets
2.2 Spam Filtering Methods
We adopted two DM classifiers, Naive Bayes (NB) and Support Vector Machine
(SVM), using the R statistical tool [14] (e1071 and kernlab packages) [14]. The
NB algorithm is widely adopted by anti-spam filtering tools [3]. It computes the
probability that an email message j ∈ {1, . . . , N} is spam (class s) for a filter
trained over D data with N examples:
p(s|xj) = β · p(s)
m∏
i=1
p(xi|s) (1)
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Fig. 3. Operating system histograms for the US1 dataset (left ham, right spam)
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Fig. 4. NHOP ham/spam box plots for the USWBS dataset (minimum, median and
maximum values, left) and spam/ham ratio evolution for the US2 dataset (right)
where β is normalization constant that ensures that p(s|x)+p(¬s|x) = 1, p(s) is
the spam frequency of dataset D and xi denotes the input feature i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The p(xi|s) estimation depends on the NB version. We used the multi-variate
Gauss NB that is implemented in the R tool [12]:
p(xi|c) = 1
σi,c
√
2pi
exp− (xij − µi,c)
2
2σ2i,c
(2)
where it is assumed each attribute (xi) follows a normal distribution for each
c = s or c = ¬s categories and the mean (µi,c) and typical deviation (σi,c) are
estimated from D.
The Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a more powerful and flexible learner,
capable of complex nonlinear mappings and was recently considered one of the
most influential DM algorithms [16]. The basic idea is transform the input
xj ∈ <m into a high f -dimensional feature space by using a nonlinear map-
ping. Then, the SVM finds the best linear separating hyperplane, related to a
set of support vector points, in the feature space. The transformation depends on
a nonlinear mapping that does not need to be explicitly known but that depends
of a kernel function. We opted for the popular gaussian kernel, which presents
less parameters and numerical difficulties than other kernels (e.g. polynomial):
K(xj ,x′j) = exp(−γ||xj − x′j ||2), γ > 0 (3)
The probabilistic output SVM computes [10]:
f(xj) =
∑
p∈SV ypαpK(xp,xj) + b
p(s|xj) = 1/(1 + exp(Af(xj) +B)) (4)
where SV is the set of support vectors, yj ∈ {−1, 1} is the output for message
j (if spam yj=1, else yj = −1), b and αp are coefficients of the model, and A
and B are determined by solving a regularized maximum likelihood problem.
Under this setup, the SVM performance is affected by two parameters: γ, the
parameter of the kernel, and C, a penalty parameter. Since the search space
for these parameters is high, we heuristically set the least relevant parameter to
C = 3 [4]. For NSV, γ is set using a grid search (i.e. γ ∈ {2−15, 2−13, . . . , 23}).
During this search, the training data was further split into training (first 2/3 of
D) and validation sets (last 1/3). Then, the best γ (i.e. with the highest AUC
in the validation set) was selected and the model was retrained with all D data.
Since the WSV model requires much more computation (with up to 3000 features
when compared with the 4 NSV inputs), for this model we set γ = 2−3.
DM models such as NB and SVM are harder to interpret when compared
with simpler methods (e.g multiple regression). Still, it is possible to extract
knowledge in terms of input relevance by using a sensitivity analysis procedure
[5]. This procedure is applied after the training phase and analyzes the model
responses when the inputs are changed. Let p(s|x(l)) denote the output obtained
by holding all input variables at their average values except xa, which varies
through its entire range with l ∈ {1, . . . , L} levels. If a given input variable
(xa ∈ {x1, . . . , xm}) is relevant then it should produce a high variance (Va).
Thus, its relative importance (Ra) can be given by:
Va =
∑L
l=1 (p(s|x(l))− p(s|x(l)))2/(L− 1)
Ra = Va/
∑m
i=1 Vi × 100 (%)
(5)
In this work, we propose novel filters based on network-level inputs and
compare these with bag-of-words models and blacklists. For the first two classes
of filters, we tested both NB and SVM algorithms using either network based
attributes or word frequencies. The complete set of models includes:
– NNB and NSV, NB and SVM classifiers using the four inputs from Table 1;
– WNB and WSV, NB and SVM using word frequencies;
– Eight blacklist based models (B1,. . .,B8), where spam probabilities are set
to p(s|xj) = 1 if the IP is present in the corresponding DNSBL, else it is 0;
– finally, the All Blacklist (AB) method that outputs p(s|xj) = 1 if any of the
eight DNSBLs was activated, otherwise it returns 0.
Regarding the bag-or-words models (WNB and WSV), we used the prepro-
cessing adopted in [6]. First, all attachments are removed. In the case of ham,
all mailing list signatures are also deleted. Then, word frequencies are extracted
from the subject and body message (with the HTML tags previously removed).
Next, we apply a feature selection that is based in ignoring any words whose
frequency is lower than 5 in the training set (D) and then selecting up to the
3000 most relevant words according to a mutual information criterion. Finally,
we apply a TF-IDF and length normalization transform to the word frequencies.
All preprocessing was performed using the perl [2] and R languages [14].
2.3 Evaluation
To access the predictive performances, we adopted the realistic incremental re-
training evaluation procedure, where a mailbox is split into batches b1, . . . , bn of
k adjacent messages (|bn| may be less than k) [12]. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, the
filter is trained with D = b1 ∪ . . . ∪ bi and tested with the messages from bi+1.
For a given probabilistic filter, the predicted class is given by: s if p(s|xj) >
D, where D ∈ [0.0, 1.0] is a decision threshold. For a given D and test set, it is
possible to compute the true (TPR) and false (FPR) positive rates:
TPR = TP/(TP + FN)
FPR = FP/(FP + TN) (6)
where TP , FP , TN and FN denote the number of true positives, false positives,
true negatives and false negatives. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve shows the performance of a two class classifier across the range of possible
threshold (D) values, plotting FPR (x-axis) versus TPR (y-axis) [7]. The global
accuracy is given by the area under the curve (AUC =
∫ 1
0
ROCdD). A random
classifier will have an AUC of 0.5, while the ideal value should be close to 1.0.
With the incremental retraining procedure, one ROC is computed for each bi+1
batch and the overall results are presented by adopting the vertical averaging
ROC (i.e. according to the FPR axis) algorithm presented in [7]. Statistical
confidence is given by the t-student test [8].
3 Experiments and Results
We tested all methods from Section 2.2 in all datasets from Table 2 and using
a retraining evaluation with a batch size of k = 100 (a reasonable value also
adopted in [12]). The obtained results are summarized as the mean of all test
sets (bi+1, i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}), with the respective 95% confidence intervals and
shown in Tables 3 and 4. To increase clarity, we only show the best blacklist (B6)
in Table 3. In the tables, the best values are in bold, while underline denotes
a statistical significance (i.e. p-value<0.05). In Table 3, the significance was
computed for a paired t-test comparison of the network-level approach against
AB and the corresponding bag-of-words method (e.g. NSV vs AB and WSV).
In Table 4, the paired t-test is performed against the second best blacklist (B4).
Under the AUC metric and for all setups, the NSV method is the best choice
and the obtained results are of high quality (from 95.3% to 99.8%). The NNB is
the second best filter for the last three datasets. It is also interesting to notice
that both NSV and NNB are robust to a geographic spread of the ham origin,
since there is only a slight decrease (0.4 and 0.8 pp) when comparing US2 and
US1 filtering performances. For WSV, the detection capability is higher when
there is Portuguese ham (PT and US1PT). This was an expected behavior,
since most spam is written in English. The bag-of-words performances decrease
substantially for the last setup, showing that the spam that is not detected in
blacklists is more difficult to classify based on content. However, our network-
level based methods still obtained high AUC values, around 95%. When using
the same inputs, the SVM algorithm is always better when compared with NB,
with an average improvement of 1.2 pp for the network-level features and 9.7 pp
for the bag-of-words attributes.
Table 3. Comparison among the main filters (AUC test set results, in %)
setup B6 AB WNB WSV NNB NSV
US1 98.0±0.8 98.9±0.5 73.0±4.7 75.8±2.2 98.7±0.6 99.8±0.2
US2 98.1±0.7 98.9±0.6 65.4±2.7 77.0±2.3 97.9±0.8 99.4±0.5
PT 83.9±4.5 89.0±3.4 71.4±7.5 82.1±5.1 95.6±1.5 97.3±1.6
US1PT 94.5±0.9 96.3±0.8 68.4±3.4 78.2±2.0 98.2±0.5 99.2±0.4
USWBS 50.0±0.0 50.0±0.0 50.1±0.3 63.6±7.6 94.7±3.4 95.3±3.6
Table 4. Blacklist filter performances (AUC test set results, in %)
setup B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
US1 87.6±1.2 80.2±1.8 80.8±1.6 87.7±1.2 58.7±1.1 98.0±0.8 74.3±2.6 67.1±2.6
US2 88.7±1.2 80.3±2.0 79.4±2.0 88.9±1.2 59.2±1.0 98.1±0.7 74.0±2.6 67.5±3.0
PT 76.0±3.8 74.7±2.1 69.1±3.7 78.0±4.2 59.0±3.0 83.9±4.5 65.5±3.0 63.0±4.5
US1PT 84.5±1.0 79.0±1.5 77.2±1.1 85.2±0.9 58.7±1.1 94.5±0.9 72.2±1.8 66.2±2.0
Regarding the blacklist comparison (Table 4), B6 is clearly the best filter.
Overall, the second best DNSBL is B4, followed by B1. For all setups, three
blacklists (B5, B7 and B8) are outperformed by the WSV model. B5 is the worst
filter, with no average AUC value above 60%. For all DNSBLs except B5, the
worst performance is achieved for the Portuguese dataset (PT). This outcome
was expected, since the tested blacklists are international and thus may fail in
mapping more country specific spam.
The full ROC analysis is given in Figure 5. To increase clarity, we only
selected the best and worst blacklists (B6 and B5). The ROC curve allows the
definition of different filtering profiles, according to the user needs. In the studied
datasets, the blacklists never output a false positive. Thus, for B6 and AB,
the TPR values are high when FPR is zero. For the spam domain, this is an
important point of the ROC curve, since often the cost of losing normal e-mail
(FP ) is much higher than receiving spam (FN). This is particularly true if the
email client action is set to delete messages marked as spam. For this decision
point, AB, followed by B6, are the best filters, except for US1 and USWBS, where
NSV is the best option. For larger admissible values of FPR, NSV gives the best
TPR values. It should be noted that for some users, this is an interesting scenario,
as the cost of receiving spam can also be high, due to an higher vulnerability to
phishing attacks, viruses or online fraud, while not all ham is important. Since
often email clients move messages marked as spam to a different folder, false
positives could still be read by the user.
The average network-level feature importances for NSV are plotted in Figure
6. The bar plots show the Ra values, while the whiskers denote the 95% confi-
dence intervals. The US1 importance bars are not shown, since they are similar
to US2. All four attributes contribute to the model, although their relative influ-
ences vary. For example, the operating system (OS) is the most relevant feature
for the US datasets, although it is the least important input for PT. On the
other hand, the length of the message path (NHOP) is most relevant attribute
for PT and US1PT.
To study the filtering vulnerability to phishing email attacks, we searched
within the datasets for spam messages asking for user password details (e.g.
related to a bank online account). Five messages were found and the respective
spam probability predictions (p(s|xj)) are shown in Table 5. The first column of
the table shows the dataset that contained such messages. Although the number
of examples is not enough for a more definitive conclusion, the results seem to
favor the network-level based methods. For a decision threshold of D = 0.5, NSV
detects all attacks, while NNB predicts four. The less robust methods are B6
and WSV.
4 Conclusions
In this work, we proposed a new spam filtering approach that is based on four
network-level attributes: message path length in terms of number of routers
(NHOP), geographic coordinates (i.e. latitude and longitude) and operating sys-
Table 5. Filter responses to phishing messages (values above 0.5 are in bold)
setup B6 AB WNBWSV NNB NSV
US1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.62 1.00 0.99
US1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.36 1.00 0.98
US2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.28 1.00 1.00
PT 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 1.00 0.91
US1PT 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.00 0.96
tem of the sender. We tested two data mining (DM) classifiers, Naive Bayes (NB)
and Support Vector Machines (SVM) and also targeted two countries from differ-
ent continents and with different main languages (i.e. U.S. and Portugal). Since
our network-level properties are not currently monitored by filtering systems,
we created and developed a new spam repository, called spam telescope. This
repository includes real legitimate (ham) and non legitimate (spam) messages.
The ham was collected from several mailing lists, while the spam was captured
from email traps (fake addresses advertised through the Web). Several experi-
ments were carried out, where a realistic mixture of spam and ham was used to
simulate distinct user profiles.
When comparing with Content-Based filters (CBF), i.e. bag-of-words, and
eight DNS-based Blackhole Lists (DNSBL), the NSV method (SVM fed with the
four network-level features) obtained the best discriminatory performance, with
high quality results (from 95.3% to 99.8%). The NSV method requires much less
computation than the respective bag-of-words filter. Also, in contrast with the
blacklist methods, it does not require communication with other servers, since
the free geographic IP database that we used can be installed locally. Moreover,
preliminary results suggest that NSV is more robust to phishing email attacks.
Based on the achieved results, we advise the use of the NSV filter, which
provides a high true positive rate (i.e. detects most of the spam). To reduce false
positives (i.e. ham marked as spam), this method could be used after a first
phase blacklist filtering. Yet, for an effective blacklisting, it should be considered
a careful DNSBL server selection or (even better) use of multiple DNSBLs.
Spammers and anti-spammers are in a continuous struggle. The research
community has devoted a large attention to improve CBF. Yet, as argued in
[15], spammers can easily change content to confuse CBF filters but network-
level properties are more persistent in time. For example, a large portion of
current spam comes from botnets. Most spammers are greedy and want a mas-
sive distribution of spam, thus they do not care about the location of a given
controlled machine. Furthermore, some operating systems (e.g. Windows) are
more vulnerable to botnet control by malicious software. Hence, we believe it
is more difficult for spammers to surpass network-level based filters. As future
work, we intend to enlarge the experiments to other countries (e.g. Spain). Also,
we wish to deploy the proposed models in real email clients (e.g. Thunderbird)
to gather more feedback.
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Fig. 5. Average test set ROC curves
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Fig. 6. Average input importances for the NSV model
